Ukrainian military reporting and some independent conflict monitors describe a Russian brigade-sized formation that attempted to withdraw under pressure but was instead encircled, with Ukrainian sources estimating 2,500–3,000 troops cut off behind Ukrainian lines in eastern Ukraine.
Loss of forward command posts, artillery support, and armored vehicles reportedly transformed an attempted controlled withdrawal into disorder. Ukrainian commanders state that Russian retreat routes were deliberately targeted with drones and artillery to prevent breakout attempts, turning the withdrawal into a destructive collapse.
A Familiar Pattern of Encirclement
This event fits a recurring pattern observed throughout the war, in which Russian forces overextend and then struggle to execute organized withdrawals under Ukrainian fire. Similar collapses or near-encirclements have been reported around Lyman, Bakhmut, and sectors of the Kharkiv and Donetsk fronts, where Russian units have been forced into hasty retreats under pressure.
Analysts consistently note weaknesses in rear-area security, logistics coordination, and protected withdrawal planning on the Russian side. Russian and Soviet doctrine has traditionally emphasized avoiding encirclement, making repeated brigade-level traps both militarily damaging and symbolically destabilizing for Russian command structures.
The Role of Ukraine’s 413th “Raid” Regiment
Ukraine’s 413th “Raid” Regiment, part of the Unmanned Systems Forces, illustrates how drones now shape battlefield outcomes. On November 27, 2025, Ukrainian and pro-Ukrainian sources reported that an FPV drone from this unit struck and disabled the radar of a Russian 9K33 Osa-AKM short-range air-defense system on the eastern front.
These reports indicate the strike occurred as Russian forces sought to stabilize their positions and adjust lines under pressure, making the loss of air defense especially consequential for subsequent movements.
The Osa-AKM: Designed for a Different War
The Soviet-era 9K33 Osa-AKM (NATO: SA-8 Gecko) was developed in the early 1970s to counter aircraft and helicopters rather than small FPV drones. It typically carries six ready-to-fire missiles with an engagement range of roughly 1.5–10 kilometers and an altitude envelope from low altitudes up to around 5 kilometers.
Its radar and guidance systems struggle with slow, low-signature drones operating close to terrain or using masking, a limitation repeatedly highlighted in Ukraine-related reporting. Multiple visually documented incidents show Osa systems destroyed or disabled by Ukrainian drones and loitering munitions since 2022.
The Cost-Exchange Reality
Modern drone warfare has introduced extreme cost asymmetry into air-defense engagements. FPV drones used by Ukrainian forces are widely reported to cost from hundreds to a few thousand dollars per unit, depending on configuration. By contrast, a complete Osa-AKM system with vehicle, radar, and missile load-out is a multi-million-dollar asset when measured against comparable short-range systems and replacement costs discussed in open-source defense reporting.
Even under conservative assumptions, this creates a dramatically unfavorable cost-exchange ratio for Russia, and repeated losses steadily erode its inventory of high-value systems while Ukraine expends comparatively low-cost drones.
Air-Defense Coverage Gaps in Retreat
Short-range air-defense systems such as Osa-AKM provide localized protection for maneuvering units and critical points, so their destruction immediately opens tactical gaps. Even limited coverage can be decisive along narrow retreat corridors, road junctions, and staging areas.
Ukrainian sources state that once Russian short-range air defense in certain sectors was neutralized, FPV drones and loitering munitions were able to strike withdrawing vehicles along roads and choke points with greater freedom. This increased exposure plausibly accelerates the loss of vehicles and further disrupts organized movement during withdrawals.
The Radar Paradox
Air-defense crews face a fundamental dilemma: radar must be active to detect aerial threats, but active radar also makes the system detectable to Ukrainian electronic intelligence and targeting assets. Open-source footage and battlefield analyses show multiple cases where air-defense systems are located and engaged after emitting radar or other signatures.
During a retreat, this dilemma becomes acute because withdrawing columns depend heavily on air-defense cover but radar emissions can draw FPV and artillery strikes onto the very systems meant to shield them. Crews thus must choose between increasing their own survivability by limiting emissions or protecting surrounding troops against drones.
Pokrovsk and the Wider Operational Environment
The reported encirclement took place amid heavy fighting in eastern Ukraine, including areas in and around the Pokrovsk axis, where Russian and Ukrainian forces contest key transport hubs and defensive lines. This region has seen concentrated troop deployments, frequent artillery exchanges, and intensive drone use by both sides.
Ukrainian forces have increasingly targeted Russian logistics nodes, fuel depots, and command posts in the rear, seeking to degrade sustainment and command resilience. In this environment, any forced withdrawal becomes inherently dangerous, as supply routes and reserves are already under persistent observation and attack.
Command Breakdown and the “Deadly Retreat”
Encirclements rarely occur without prior disruption to command and control. Ukrainian and Western assessments indicate that Russian headquarters elements, communications infrastructure, and logistics hubs in contested areas have been repeatedly struck by artillery, missiles, and drones. When Ukrainian forces interdict key roads and junctions, units attempting to retreat may find previously viable corridors cut or under direct fire.
Military analysts use terms such as “deadly retreat” or “retreat under fire” to describe situations in which withdrawing units move under enemy observation and sustained attack, leading to rapid fragmentation and rising casualties. Such dynamics are consistent with descriptions of Russian units trying to pull back through compromised routes and being broken into smaller, less coordinated groups.
Strategic Impact of Continued Air-Defense Losses
Russia has incurred documented losses across several layers of its air-defense architecture in Ukraine, including long-range S-300/S-400 components and medium- to short-range systems such as Buk, Tor, and Osa. Each destroyed or disabled system erodes both local coverage and the overall density and redundancy of the air-defense network.
Open-source estimates describe days in which Russia lost multiple air-defense systems worth tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in total. Replacing these systems is slow and resource-intensive, which means that during operations like this brigade’s attempted retreat, any absence or degradation of functioning air defense increases vulnerability to Ukrainian drones and precision artillery.
Psychological and Morale Effects
The loss or perceived absence of air-defense cover has significant psychological effects on troops operating under constant drone threat. Reporting from the Ukraine war shows that soldiers facing repeated overhead surveillance and strike drones often describe a persistent sense of exposure and stress.
When units believe they are isolated, under observation, and without effective protection, morale and cohesion tend to decline, and instances of disorderly withdrawal or unauthorized movement become more likely. Such fragmentation increases vulnerability, as small groups or individual vehicles are easier to detect and target with drones and artillery than well-coordinated formations.
Operational and Political Fallout
The destruction or isolation of a brigade-sized force effectively removes thousands of troops, along with their equipment, from Russia’s available combat strength in that sector. Reconstituting such a formation requires not only replacement personnel but also trained leadership, specialized crews, and major equipment replenishment, all of which take considerable time.
Operationally, this constrains Russia’s ability to sustain or launch offensives on other axes, as resources must be diverted to fill gaps. Politically and informationally, visible large-scale retreats and geolocated footage of abandoned positions or equipment complicate official narratives of uninterrupted progress, particularly when widely amplified by Ukrainian and international media.
Ukraine’s Drone-Centric Operational Method
Ukraine increasingly integrates mass drone use with artillery and maneuver forces at the operational level. Drones are used for reconnaissance to identify command vehicles, air-defense assets, and logistics hubs, and then to adjust artillery fire or deliver direct FPV strikes.
Once Russian air defense and key support nodes are degraded, Ukrainian ground forces can pressure flanks and seams while drones continue to interdict movement and resupply. This layered approach, documented in multiple sectors, makes it easier to create or exploit local encirclements when Russian units are overextended or forced into hasty retreats.
Historical Echoes in a Technological Age
Encirclement has long been a decisive instrument of warfare, from major World War II “cauldron” battles on the Eastern Front to Cold War-era operational doctrines. What differs today is the role of precision sensors and cheap unmanned systems.
In Ukraine, FPV drones, loitering munitions, and precision artillery now perform many functions once fulfilled by massed armor and large air formations, including closing escape routes and punishing exposed columns. The trapped Russian formations in eastern Ukraine illustrate how modern technology compresses time and space: pockets can form faster, escape windows can close sooner, and losses can accumulate more rapidly than in earlier eras.
Why This Retreat Is Significant
Many retreats in this war have been costly, but this one stands out in reporting for its reported scale and conditions. With Ukrainian sources estimating 2,500–3,000 Russian troops trapped, alongside confirmed losses of armored vehicles, artillery, and at least one Osa-AKM system, observers describe it as one of the more serious brigade-level breakdowns since 2022.
The episode underscores how outdated air defense, disrupted command and control, and Ukraine’s maturing drone capabilities can rapidly degrade a formation’s combat effectiveness during withdrawal. While exact casualty figures remain subject to verification, available evidence supports the assessment that this retreat inflicted exceptionally heavy losses on a single large Russian formation.
Sources:
- Institute for the Study of War – Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments (Nov–Dec 2025)
- Reuters, Al Jazeera, Kyiv Independent – reporting on Pokrovsk sector and encirclement dynamics
- Defence-UA, United24, Militarnyi – documentation of Ukrainian FPV strikes on Osa-AKM and other Russian air defenses
- Newsweek and other outlets on Russian air defense losses and cost estimates
- Background on broader encirclement patterns and attrition strategy