
Bright orange flashes pierced the pre‑dawn sky over Dzerzhinsk at around 02:30 AM. Witnesses described 25–30 explosions over the next hour; the blasts were powerful enough to rattle houses and trigger car alarms.
These explosions lit up the night sky and shook windows across Dzerzhinsk, revealing that something extraordinary had happened at Russia’s main explosives plant.
Strategic Strike

The attack was not a random cross‑border raid. Ukrainian long‑range drones penetrated about 750 kilometres into Russian territory to hit the Ya. M. Sverdlov State‑Owned Plant, a heavily defended industrial complex that Moscow considers a critical part of its war machine.
By striking the “heartbeat” of Russian ammunition production, Ukrainian forces demonstrated a capability to overcome Russia’s layered air defences and deliver precision attacks deep inside the country.
Industrial Fortress

The Sverdlov plant has anchored Dzerzhinsk’s economy since 1916. It spreads across 1,100 hectares and contains around 1,000 buildings, 120 kilometres of highways, and an extensive internal railway.
Employing roughly 5,000 workers, this sprawling complex includes thermal power plants and huge production workshops. Its scale and history illustrate why analysts refer to it as an “industrial fortress” that has survived revolution, world wars, and the Soviet collapse.
War Economy

Russia’s military‑industrial complex has expanded rapidly since February 2022. According to the Jamestown Foundation, the output of gunpowder and explosives nearly doubled between 2022 and 2024 as plants imported more cotton, cellulose nitrate, and increased production capacity.
Analysts estimate that Russia refurbished or produced around 4.5 million artillery rounds in 2024, dwarfing Western output; European and U.S. producers made roughly 1.2 million rounds, though they aim to increase production. This growth, coupled with lower manufacturing costs for 152‑mm shells, has enabled Moscow to sustain intensive bombardments despite a much smaller economy.
Monopoly Shattered

Ukraine’s General Staff confirmed that its drones struck the Sverdlov explosives factory on 6 October 2025. Reuters and defence analysts note that this facility is Russia’s only significant industrial‑scale producer of the high‑energy explosives RDX and HMX, compounds used in virtually every Russian munition from artillery shells to ballistic missiles.
Multiple explosions and fires across the 1,100‑hectare complex followed the pre‑dawn assault. Ukrainian officials framed the strike as a blow against the “nerve centre” of Russia’s arms production, while Moscow initially downplayed the damage.
Supply Chain

The attack highlighted Russia’s precarious munitions supply chain. Ukraine’s defence intelligence estimates that North Korea now supplies 35–50 % of Russia’s artillery shells, delivering about 200,000–260,000 rounds per month.
Reuters reported that Russia imported around 2.7 million shells from Pyongyang in 2024, mostly of poor quality. Thus, nearly 40 % of Russian artillery ammunition in 2024 came from foreign suppliers. With the Sverdlov plant disrupted, Moscow may have to increase reliance on overseas munitions and accept lower‑quality shells.
Global Stakes

Shutting down the only major producer of RDX/HMX in Russia reverberates beyond the battlefield. Military analysts estimate that Russia consumed explosives equivalent to NATO’s entire annual ammunition production every three months, highlighting the scale of Moscow’s war effort.
The high‑explosive market is thin; Europe reportedly has only one TNT factory, creating global shortages. Disrupting a single plant can therefore ripple through international defence supply chains, raising questions about how long combatants can sustain artillery‑heavy warfare.
Sanctions Reality

The Sverdlov plant has been under comprehensive U.S., EU, and UK sanctions since 2023. A U.S. State Department notice lists “Federal State Enterprise YA M Sverdlov Plant” as a large state‑owned enterprise that produces explosives, industrial chemicals, detonators, and ammunition.
Reuters further reports that the plant’s parent company is sanctioned for assisting Russia’s war effort. Despite these restrictions, the facility continued expanding production through shadow procurement networks and Chinese intermediaries, prompting Western officials to describe it as a strategic threat to European security.
Backup Plan

Moscow has been building a new RDX production facility at the Biysk Oleum Plant in Siberia. Reuters found that the project, costing 15.5 billion rubles, aims to produce about 6,000 metric tons of high explosives annually—enough to fill about 1.28 million OF‑29 152‑mm artillery shells.
Located roughly 3,000 km from Ukraine’s border, the plant is intended to be out of range of current Ukrainian drones. Although construction has faced delays, experts predict the facility could start producing explosives within weeks once completed, giving Russia a “backup” source to replace Sverdlov’s output.
Expert Assessment

Explosives expert Thomas Klapetke of Ludwig Maximilian University described the planned 6,000‑ton output of the Biysk plant as “a huge amount” that could vastly increase Russian munitions production. He noted that such an output would make it difficult for Western powers to match Russia’s artillery supplies.
Another analyst from the Royal United Services Institute argued that increasing high‑explosive availability is critical to sustaining Moscow’s war effort. Given that RDX/HMX production requires specialised equipment and expertise subject to sanctions, replacing damaged capacity at Sverdlov is likely to be time‑consuming and costly.
Future Vulnerability

The successful strike demonstrates Ukraine’s growing ability to hit deep‑rear targets. Long‑range drones penetrated Russian airspace to attack a facility 750 km away, challenging traditional notions of strategic depth.
As Kyiv develops more sophisticated unmanned systems, previously safe rear‑area factories and depots may face increasing threat. The Kremlin must now allocate air‑defence resources across a vast geography, stretching its capacity to protect critical infrastructure.
Political Ramifications

The attack occurred amid an intensifying debate in the West over Ukraine’s use of long‑range weapons against Russian territory. Some European officials argue that striking military‑industrial targets is a legitimate act of self‑defence, especially given Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
Reuters reported that the United States decided to share intelligence with Kyiv to help it target Russian energy facilities, signalling a policy shift toward supporting long‑range strikes. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov condemned this support, accusing NATO of direct involvement. These debates may influence future weapons transfers and rules of engagement.
International Response

NATO allies have quietly applauded Ukraine’s ability to degrade Russia’s munitions production without escalating to nuclear facilities or indiscriminate attacks. Western analysts note that precision strikes on industrial chokepoints align with NATO’s strategic goal of weakening Moscow’s war‑making capacity while avoiding a broader conflict.
Intelligence sharing from the U.S. and other allies likely assisted in identifying and targeting the Sverdlov plant. The muted but supportive international response suggests growing consensus that Russia’s military‑industrial base is a legitimate target when it fuels aggression against Ukraine.
Warfare Evolution

The drone assault underscores a broader shift in modern warfare. Small, inexpensive unmanned systems can now penetrate deep into enemy territory and neutralise billion‑dollar industrial complexes.
This development challenges the traditional concept of rear‑area safety and strategic depth. In future conflicts, victory may hinge as much on industrial resilience and supply‑chain security as on frontline tactics, making factories and logistics hubs as important as trenches and armoured vehicles.
Endgame

Ukraine’s strike on Russia’s explosives monopoly signals its transformation from defensive victim to strategic aggressor capable of hitting the Kremlin’s war machine at its source. Both sides are locked in an industrial competition: Russia is racing to expand explosive production through projects like the Biysk plant, while Ukraine is developing long‑range drones to disrupt those efforts.
As supply chains become battlefields and factories become fortresses, the war in Ukraine increasingly resembles a contest of industrial capacity rather than a conventional clash of armies.